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Abstract
This paper examines innovating firms’ incentives to engage in defensive patent-
ing. It first establishes a “truce equilibrium” in patent enforcement: when litigation is
costly, the equal strength of two symmetric parties’ patent portfolios deters any patent
disputes along the equilibrium path. This equilibrium behavior generates two bene-
fits of defensive patenting, namely, to prevent licensing outlays and to protect down-
stream investments. In addition, firms can use patents to coordinate non-contractible
investment decisions. Depending on the joint interests, they can either reach a license
in order to guarantee high investment incentives, or agree not to grant a license so
that investments are deterred by the litigation threat. On the other hand, the strategic
patenting concern may generate a bandwagon of patent accumulation, where firms
rush to the patent office to get a patent, but the subsequent investment performance
is the same as when there is no patent at all.
The paper also argues that defensive patenting may weaken the effectiveness of
patents as an appropriation scheme. This offers an explanation that the “pro-patent”
∗I would like to thank Bernard Caillaud, Vincenzo Denicolo`, Gerard Llobet, Simon Ma, Jae Nahm, Is-
abel Pereira, Richard Schmidtke, Ce´dric Schneider, Jean Tirole, and Yanhua Zhang for valuable comments.
Feedback from participants of ENTER jamboree 2005, IT Workshop at Universite´ de Toulouse 1, IO and In-
novation Conference at GAEL, 2005 Kiel-MunichWorkshop on the Economics of Information and Network
Industries, XXI JEI at Bilbao, ESSID 2005 at Corsica, and 2nd ZEW Conference on Innovation and Patenting
are appreciated. Special thanks go to Jean Tirole for his patience and continuing encouragement. All errors
are mine. Comments are welcome.
†IMT Lucca, Piazza San Ponziano 6, 55100 Lucca, Italy; (email: jy.chioiu@imtlucca.it).
policy shift in the United States since the 1980s may actually have undermined the
incentive power of the patent system.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom tells us that, to benefit from her patents, a patent-holder needs
to take an aggressive stance. She needs to enforce, or at least to show the willingness
to enforce her patent rights against potential infringers, either to extract licensing in-
come or to prevent them from spoiling her competitive advantage in downstream
markets through unpermitted imitation. Besides this traditional “offensive” view, an-
other incentive to pursue patents, namely, defensive patenting, has long been driving
firms’ intellectual property rights (IPR) management in different industries.
By defensive patenting, we mean the accumulation of a patent portfolio for the
purpose of settling IPR disputes or deterring patent attacks in the first place. For
example,
At Microsoft, we used to pay little attention to patents–we would just make new
things, and that would be it. Then we started getting worried–other big competi-
tors (much bigger than we were at the time) had been patenting their inventions
for some years, and it made us vulnerable. . . . One of these big companies could
dig through their patent portfolio, find something close to what we had done, then
sue us, and we would have to go through an elaborate defense and possibly lose. So
Microsoft did what most big companies do, which is start to build what is called
a ‘defensive’ patent portfolio. So if a big company tried to sue us, we could find
something in our portfolio they were afoul of, and countersue. . . . since it was in-
tolerable for all parties to engage, it resulted in a state called ‘de´tente’, or ‘standoff’.
This is what you see today for the most part in lots of industries. (Chris Prateley,
2004)1
Despite its practical importance, defensive patenting has received little attention
on the theoretical front. Accordingly, many open questions remain to be answered.
For instance, the quotedMicrosoft story and interview studies, e.g. Cohen et al. (2000),
Hall and Ziedonis (2001), have identified the “freedom of operation” as a prominent
motivation for pursuing this strategy. When equipped with a patent shield, firms can
invest in production facilities or further R&D fearless of threats from others’ patent
attacks. Questions then arise: What is the impact of defensive patenting on product
1Chris Prateley is a group program manager at Microsoft. This story is quoted from his
blog: http://blogs.msdn.com/Chris Pratley/archive/2004/05/01/124586.aspx (last visit on October 22,
2005). Similar stories can be found in von Hippel (1988)’s study in the semiconductor industry, and
Taylor and Silberston (1973)’s in electronic engineering in the 1960s.
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market competition? Does it generate bandwagons in patenting, and is it responsible
for recent patent surge? And ultimately how does it alter incentives for innovation?
This paper takes a first pass at these issues.
In a simple two-firm-three-stage model (section 2), we assume firms have already
completed the R&D stage and hold a basic technology. They first choose whether to
patent the basic technology, then make an investment decision. This downstream in-
vestment is subject to infringement risk. At the last stage of the game, patent-holders
make enforcement decisions. A patent’s defensive value is established by a truce equi-
librium in strategic patent enforcement, in which any offensive enforcement is fully
deterred and no patent disputes ensue along the equilibrium path (section 3). The
intuition is similar to nuclear deterrence: if two countries possess nuclear weapons,
no one gains from using them, and so peace is maintained.
We apply this equilibrium behavior to two issues. In section 4, defensive patenting
is considered as a counter measure to the other patentee’s hold-up threat. We show
that, indeed, a defensive patent alleviates the hold-up threat and partially restores in-
vestment incentives. For symmetric firms, in addition, we find that patents can help
firms to coordinate the non-contractible investment decisions. According to their joint
interests, firms can agree to grant a license in order to preserve the investment incen-
tives, or refuse to grant a license, so that the investment is deterred by the litigation
threat. Alternatively, the strategic patenting concern may induce a bandwagon of so-
cially wasteful patent accumulation. That is, firms rush to the patent office to acquire
patents, but the overall investment performance along the equilibrium path is the
same as when there is no patent at all.
Section 5 identifies an harmful effect of defensive patenting on innovation incen-
tives. When the truce equilibrium’s deterrence power is available to her potential
licensees or imitators, an inventor loses the option to employ the patent system as
the compensation channel for her R&D efforts or technology disclosure. Through a
simple example, we show that increasing patent protection could induce a potential
licensee to patent defensively, and so an inventor would substitute from patent to
trade secrecy for her valuable invention. When trade secrecy provides little licensing
opportunity, say, due to Arrow problem, technology flow is hampered in a “strong”
patent regime. This example illustrates that a “pro-patent” reform, as in the Unites
States in the 1980s, may be detrimental to the very purpose of the patent system.
To conclude the chapter, section 6 provides some policy implications of our results
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and discusses future research. Appendix A collects proofs.
 Institutional background: Both technology and legal factors are crucial to the
defensive patenting strategy. On the technological side, a “complex technology” field
breeds this strategy, where a firm’s survival hinges on the access to others’ technolo-
gies. In the semiconductor and software industry, for instance, it is a typical case that
multiple inventions are integrated to fabricate a product, and one technology, say, a
manufacturing process, is covered by a multitude of patents in the hands of different
owners. These fields also pose intrinsic difficulties for courts to determine the valid-
ity and actual boundary of a patent, and so nobody can be sure whether they will
infringe on others’ patent rights.
On the legal side, since 1980s the U. S. patent system has been strengthened in sev-
eral ways: the number of patentable subjects has been expanded, the court has more
frequently validated disputed patents, and the power of patent-holders has increased
through injunction grants. Another trend worth noting is that, as some authors claim,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has been issuing low quality patents
over the past decade.2 Combining these policy shifts with technology features, what
we have is, in the words of Shapiro (2001), a “patent thicket”: firms can get patents
more easily, but also more likely infringe on others’ patent rights. Several solutions
based on technology sharing have been suggested to curb this problem;3 meanwhile,
firms continue patent accumulation for licensing as well as defensive purposes.
 Related literature: Among the patent litigation literature, our construction of
strategic enforcement between two patent-holders differentiates this paper frommost
previousworks. InMeurer (1989), Crampes and Langinier (2002), Choi (2003??), patents
are enforced against non-patent-holding technology users. In contrast, our firms have
the dual roles of patent-holders and technology users, and the lawsuit is filed by one
2See Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a general discussion. Concerning the patent quality, Quillen and Webster
(2001) shows that after taking into account the continuation application and continuation-in-part applica-
tions, the USPTO’s allowance rate (the number of applications allowed divided by the number filed) in the
mid-1990s is 95%, compared to 68% and 65% for the European and Japanese patent offices, respectively.
Possible reasons are: the explosion of patent applications; the emergence of applications in new fields
where PTO hasn’t acquired proper capacity, e.g. technology expertise and searching database; the resource
constraints and the perverse incentives facing the USPTO; the high turn-over among the examiners; and
the inadequate incentive schemes imposed on examiners. See Merges (1999) .
3Two typical collective IPRs arrangements are patent pools and cross-licenses. See Shapiro (2001).
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against the other.4 This feature can also be found in Bessen (2003),Me´nie`re and Parlane
(2004). Especially in the second paper, the authors also obtain a negative effect of
patent protection on investment incentives. But the two studies are conducted in
a rather different economic environment than ours. First, due to costless litigation,
enforcement always follows patenting in their models. By contrast, we bring back
enforcement costs and find a “truce equilibrium,” which, as we shall see, is the driv-
ing force of our results. Second, both papers consider cases where monopoly profit is
greater than the aggregate duopoly profit, and so, with one-sided infringement, the
infringer is forced to exit the market. We consider the opposite case: the infringing
firm secures a license and stays in the market. Nevertheless, we will show that, with
some qualifications, our insights extend to the alternative environment.
Several empirical findings have inspired this paper. Concerning the patent litiga-
tion, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) finds that an infringement suit is less likely to
be filed based on a patent held by a larger firm.5 Although the critical difference in
our model, i.e. an offensive vs. a defensive patent, is absent in their empirical anal-
ysis, one could reasonably argue that this finding is consistent with our prediction:
the defensive patenting strategyworks better against a larger firmwith a bigger hold-
up stake; the truce equilibrium is more likely to be played, and so less suits are filed
involving these firms. Somaya (2003) explicitly considers countersuits and finds an
interesting stylized fact: in most cases, when a suit is countered by a countersuit, the
two are disposed of within a day of each other.6 Without any legal or administra-
tive factor underlying these two legally separated proceedings, it suggests a strong
strategic concern for countersuits.
Concerning patenting and investment, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) shows that the
recent surge of patenting propensities in the semiconductor industry is driven by
large-scale manufacturers’ aggressive patent accumulations. Since manufacturing
firms’ large investments in production facilities make them vulnerable to the litiga-
tion threat, they have legitimate concerns to amass patent portfolios in order to shield
from this risk or avoid huge balance payments in cross-licenses.
4Hence in our model it doesn’t matter whether a patent is invalidated or no infringement is found. Choi
(2003??) allows only the invalidation, although the two outcomes have different effects in his model. That
is, when a patent is invalidated, the technology is free to all users. But for heterogeneous products, a ruling
of no infringement may apply only to a subset of users.
5Their data cover U.S. patent litigations in all technological fields during 1978–1999.
6The data cover patent suits in the computer and research medicine industries filed in the U.S. federal
district courts between 1983 and 1993.
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patenting: investment: enforcement:
ex ante licensing interim licensing ex post licensing
p1, p2 ∈ {0, 1}
cost K ≥ 0
P = (p1, p2)
e1, e2 ∈ {0, 1}
cost c ≥ 0
E = (e1, e2)
suing dates T1, T2 ∈ [0,∞)
cost L > 0
patent power α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1]
t
Figure 1: Timing
Finally, our results also shed some light on the debate about the impact of U.S.
patent reforms. It has been seen as a paradox that no robust evidence could be es-
tablished to show a positive effect on the U.S. innovation activity following this pro-
patent policy shift (Jaffe, 2000). We offer one story suggesting it may actually have
reduced the incentive power of the system.
2 Model
We adopt a two-player, three-stage framework, with key elements summarized in Fig-
ure 1. Assume that two firms, F1 and F2, each holds a basic technology, A1 and A2,
eligible for patent protection. The two firms are symmetric except in section 5. A basic
technology brings positive revenue, and the revenue is higher if further investment
is made. For example, Ai may represent new functionalities and Fi can design new
products that fit better with these functionalities; or Ai is an improved manufacturing
process, and Fi can build new factories or equipments using the new process. Each Fi
faces a series of decisions: whether to apply for a patent; whether to invest; and when
possessing a patent, whether to enforce it. For simplicity, all decisions are observ-
able, no asymmetric information is involved, the only uncertainty is the enforcement
outcome, and only pure strategies are considered.
At each of the patenting and investment stages, firms simultaneously make a bi-
nary choice. Let pi and ei ∈ {0, 1} be Fi’s patenting and investment decisions, i = 1, 2.
When pi = 1, Fi obtains a patent at a cost K ≥ 0. Denote the patent profile in the
industry as P = (p1, p2). Similarly, let c ≥ 0 be the investment cost when ei = 1, and
E = (e1, e2) the investment profile. The enforcement stage, on the other hand, exhibits
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a continuous time structure from time 0 to infinity.
We say that the industry is characterized by high patent intensity if P = (1, 1), low
patent intensity if P = (1, 0) or (0, 1), and no patent if P = (0, 0). By the same token,
the industry exhibits high investment profile if E = (1, 1), low investment profile if
E = (1, 0) or (0, 1), and no investment if E = (0, 0).
 Market: Beginning at time 0, a stream of revenue accrues to firms according to
the industrial-wide investment profile. To make things simple, suppose that once
the investment has been made (with cost c), its operation can be “switched on” or
“switched off” at no additional costs or depreciation, and, at any point in time, in-
stantaneous revenues depend only on the investment that is in operation (switched
on) at that moment.
Assume the market is stationary. Slightly abusing the notation, we also use E to
denote the industry’s investment use.7 Given E = (e1, e2), let vˆe1e2 be the instanta-
neous value accruing to F1, and Vˆe1e2 the joint value. By symmetry, F2 gets vˆe2e1 and
Vˆe1e2 = vˆe1e2 + vˆe2e1 . Assume common interest rate r > 0. Denote the discounted
present value of the revenue
∫
∞
0 vˆeie je
−rtdt = vˆeie j/r as veie j , and Vˆeie j/r as Veie j , where
i,∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Throughout the chapter, we assume that a firm’s investment exerts
a negative externality on the other, but ex post efficiency requires the full employment
of established investment, as summarized below.
Assumption 1. For any e ∈ {0, 1}, v1e ≥ v0e ≥ 0,ve0 ≥ ve1 ≥ 0, and V11 ≥ V10 = V01 ≥
V00.
 Technology flow: In section 3 and 4 we assume no technology transfer between
the two firms. For example, A1 and A2 may serve as different routes to similar func-
tionalities, and each Fi needs only Ai to get to the market efficiently. However, this
doesn’t exempt Fi from infringement risk. A firm may be prohibited from using in-
house technology for reasons raised in section 1: the boundary of patent claims is hard
to predict due to complicated technological issues,8 and, contrary to trade secrecy, the
independent invention defense is not available in patent infringement cases.
7For the example of new product introduction, the product can be put on the shelf (investment “switched
on”) or withdrawn from the market (“switched off”) at zero cost. A firm’s revenue depends only on the
products on the market at that time, denoted as E.
8This uncertainty is exacerbated by the application of the “doctrine of equivalents,” which extends the
scope of a patent beyond its written claims (literal infringement).
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Both assumptions of no technology transfer and symmetric firms are relaxed in
section 5. There, in addition to A1, firm F1 holds another invention B, which is valu-
able to F2. Assume that trade secrecy provides perfect protection, but forecloses any
licensing opportunity; in contrast, patent protection is imperfect but enables licens-
ing and technology flow. We are concerned with F1’s decision to protect the valuable
technology B as a patent or trade secret.
 Patent enforcement: Consider patent litigation with following properties.
• A patent never expires. If Fi gets a patent on Ai, it can file at most one suit
against Fj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. But Fj can be found liable for infringement only if it
has invested at t = −1 and put its investment in use.
• When both firms can sue each other, i.e. when P = E = (1, 1), the enforcement
stage is partitioned into periods of equal length. At most one suit can be filed
per period.
• An infringement suit costs both parties L > 0. The patentee Fi prevails with
probability αi ∈ (0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2}. Different suits are tried independently. The
probability αi is referred to as “patent strength” or “patent power.” Symmetry,
α = α1 = α2, again, is assumed in sections 3 and 4.
• The court grants a permanent injunctive relief to the infringed party as the rem-
edy, and so a prevailing patent-holder can shutdown the infringing firm’s oper-
ation associated with the investment made at time −1. This serves as the threat
point in the post-infringement bargaining.9
With these specifications, a patent-holder Fi’s enforcement policy reduces to the suing
date Ti ∈ [0,∞), with T1 6= T2.
More precisely, to enforce its patent right, the plaintiff, say F1, sends a cease-and-
desist letter to the defendant F2 at date T1. Upon receiving the letter, the latter decides
whether to stop using its investment. If F2 stops, no litigation will ensue; and if F2
doesn’t “retreat,” the legal process begins and both parties incur costs L. The court
makes the infringement decision according to the probability α1. If there is infringe-
ment, the two bargain for a license. For simplicity, assume the whole process takes
place instantaneously at the enforcement date T1.
9We exclude monetary damages for past infringements. Our purpose is to construct a game structure in
which a defensive patent deters litigation (Proposition 1). See footnote 16 for an alternative structure.
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 Licensing: Due to the injunction remedy and, more generally, the litigation risk,
firms may want to bargain for a license, or a cross-license in the case of mutual-
blocking. We rule out downstream collusion through licensing.10 Given E at a point in
time, e.g. E = (0, 1), the instantaneous revenues vˆ01 and Vˆ01 are assumed to be path in-
dependent, i.e. not affected by the history leading to this profile.11 Referring to Figure
1, bargaining may occur at different stages of the game: ex ante licensing takes place
before investment decisions are made, but after the patenting stage; interim licens-
ing takes place after firms have chosen whether to invest, but before the enforcement
stage;12 and an ex post license is negotiated only after the court declares that the patent
is infringed. We adopt the Nash bargaining solution with equal bargaining power. To
make things interesting, assume investment decisions are not contractible at an ex ante
bargaining stage. A license merely exempts the licensee from future litigation. Most
of the analysis is conducted with ex post licensing; the other two options are discussed
in section 4.4.
Example 1. (Multi-product competition) F1 and F2 each has an original version of a
product in their own markets. Each market is composed of homogeneous consumers
of mass one; the two firms compete a` la Bertrand, but can charge different prices in
different markets. For simplicity, suppose the original version has a value v for home
market consumers, but is worthless for consumers in the other segment. Each firm
holds a monopoly in its home market. Assume no production cost. With original
versions of both goods, each firm charges a price v. In the previous notation, v00 = v.
Supposewith cost c each party canmake an improvement, which can be consumed
with firm’s own original version and has an additional value ∆v for home market
consumers, and γ∆v for consumers in the other segment, γ ∈ [0, 1]. The improvement
is not drastic enough to replace the other’s old product, γ∆v < v. Nevertheless,
it restrains the maximal price the rival monopolist can charge at the latter’s home
market. When both invest, the equilibrium prices on each market are v+ (1− γ)∆v
for the improved home product, and zero for the invading product. If only one firm
invests, it charges the monopoly price v + ∆v in its own market, competes with its
10In the example of new product introduction, no price-coordination clauses such as a running royalty
changing the cost structure, or field-of-use constraints are allowed.
11It may be that only F2 has invested, and there is no patent dispute till now; or both have invested, but
after some court fight, only F1 is declared to infringe and the two fail to agree on a license; or only F2 has
invested, is sued and declared to infringe, but has secured a license.
12This can be seen as pre-trial settlement bargaining.
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new functionality at a price zero in the adjacent market, while the old version in that
market charges only v − γ∆v. The investment revenues are: v11 = v + (1− γ)∆v,
v10 = v+ ∆v, and v01 = v− γ∆v. Summing up, V11 −V10 = (1− γ)∆v. ‖
3 Enforcement and the Truce Equilibrium
This section analyzes the enforcement stage. Assume that there is no prior agreement
which waives patent-holders’ rights to sue. We derive payoffs of the game according
to how many suits can be filed.
 Patents are irrelevant: When p1e2 = p2e1 = 0, no one can file a suit; the game
ends after the investment stage. Given investments, Fi’s payoff is πi = veie j − cei,
where i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
 One effective patent: This is the case when only one firm holds a patent and
the other has invested, or both hold patents but only one firm has invested. Suppose
p1 = e2 = 1, p2e1 = 0, and F1 files a suit at time T1. Before that date, the revenue
streams accruing to F1 and F2 are vˆe11 and vˆ1e1 , respectively. At date T1, each party
incurs legal fee L. With probability 1 − α, the court finds no infringement and so
no bargaining takes place, revenue streams remain the same. With probability α, the
court finds that F2 infringes on F1’s patent. The following lemma describes the post-
infringement outcome.
Lemma 1. When F2 infringes at time T1 and there is no countersuing threat, F2 secures a
license from F1 with a payment f e
−rT1 (in present value), where f = 12(v10 − v01). The
licensing fee is independent of F1’s own investment e1.
By this lemma, F1’s expected litigation gain is α f e
−rT1 .13 We impose the following
assumption:
Assumption 2. (i) α f ≥ L; (ii)14 ∀e ∈ {0, 1}, v0e ≤ v1e − (α f + L).
13 The fact that f is independent of e1 is a special case due to our two-point investment assumption. In
general, the licensing fee should reflect the term (ve2e1 − v0e1) + (ve10 − ve1e2); see the proof of LEMMA 1.
The first part represents the gain to F2 if it is allowed to use e2, and the second part reflects the negative
impact this investment exerts on F1. Both could be affected by e1.
14I am grateful to Richard Schmidtke for this assumption.
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From this assumption, the two parties undergo the complete legal process after F1
sends the cease-and-desist letter. The first part guarantees that F1 will credibly sue;
and from the second part, F2 won’t retreat when facing the litigation threat. Note
that without Assumption 2(i), patents become irrelevant in our model; and in section
4.3 we will discuss the consequence of Assumption 2(ii) failing. This assumption
also guarantees that F1 optimally files a suit at T1 = 0. The expected payoffs are
ve11 + (α f − L) for F1 and v1e1 − (α f + L) for F2.
 A potential litigation war: When P = E = (1, 1), the firms can sue each other.
Suppose F1 (F2) files a suit at T1 (T2, respectively). As stated in section 2, we partition
the enforcement stage into periods of equal length ∆ > 0, and assume at most one
suit at each period. Assume that the two parties alternatively decide whether to sue
the other, if they haven’t done it yet. This creates a “reaction lag” ∆: if, for example,
F1 brings the first suit against F2 at T1, F2 could countersue at no earlier than T1 + ∆.
We will focus on the limiting case of ∆ → 0.
Fix ∆ > 0. Lemma 2 describes the outcome of a litigation war. Without loss of
generality, let F1 be the first mover and file the first suit at T1 (payoffs contain only
those starting from date T1, but are discounted to date 0).
Lemma 2. Suppose P = E = (1, 1) and Assumption 2 holds. If F1 sues at T1, F2 optimally
brings a countersuit at date T1 + ∆. Expected payoffs are
πs1 =
[
v11 + α f (1− e
−r∆)− L(1+ e−r∆)
]
e−rT1 , (1)
πs2 =
[
v11 − α f (1− e
−r∆)− L(1+ e−r∆)
]
e−rT1 . (2)
These results are intuitive. After the rival has exercised its patent rights, counter-
suing reduces to a unilateral attack.15 Assumption 2(i) guarantees the optimality of
doing so with the least delay. For payoffs, due to the threat from F2’s patent, F1 gets
only a “first-mover advantage” α f (1 − e−r∆) from its earlier enforcement. This ad-
vantage vanishes as F2 can respond almost simultaneously, ∆ → 0. As a consequence,
the enforcement subgame admits a truce equilibrium.16
15Since we have assumed that ex post licensing takes place only when a patent is infringed, the bargaining
at T1 (if F2 infringes on F1’s patent) makes no agreement on F2’s patent rights.
16 The same result can be reached with monetary damage reward in an alternative game structure. For
example, let the patent term be finite over [0, T), with reaction lag ∆ so small that a countersuit is always
possible; and monetary damages are rewarded for past infringements, where the damage is set at the same
level as the licensing payment derived in Lemma 1.
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Theorem 1. (Litigation deterrence and the truce equilibrium) At the enforcement stage follow-
ing P = E = (1, 1),
• a war equilibrium always exists, where both firms initiate the infringement attack at
their earliest possible dates; and
• if ∆ is small enough, there is another subgame perfect equilibrium, the truce equilibrium,
where there is no litigation on the equilibrium path.
For both firms, when ∆ → 0, the equilibrium payoffs are πw = v11 − 2L in the war equilib-
rium, and πt = v11 in the truce equilibrium.
When firms are willing to sue, they can always do so unilaterally. This generates
the war equilibrium. But both may suffer from this unilateral enforcement. In that
case, a peaceful life is in their joint interests and can be maintained by both firms
adopting the “tit-for-tat” strategy: “I won’t sue you if you haven’t sued me till now;
but whenever you sue me, I’ll bring a countersuit as early as possible.”
Remark 1. Although not unique, we will let the truce equilibrium prevail whenever it
exists. Two reasons justify this selection. First, the truce equilibrium Pareto dominates
the war equilibrium, πt > πw. Both firms are willing to coordinate on the truce
equilibrium. Second, the war equilibrium can be eliminated by introducing some
small and reasonable perturbation into the game. If there is small probability that the
other firm will not sue first, then not suing becomes a strictly dominant strategy for ∆
small enough (see Appendix B). ‖
Remark 2. The symmetry assumption should not be crucial here. The same argument
goes through as long as no parties get a positive return in expectation from a litigation
war. In section 5, we apply the truce equilibrium to a case with asymmetric firms. ‖
We conclude this section with a simple corollary.
Corollary 1. When the truce equilibrium prevails, we may observe non-monotonic relation-
ships
• between the number of suits and the number of patents: there is no litigation in an
industry with either no patent (P = (0, 0)) or high patent intensity (P = (1, 1)),
and one infringement suit when only one firm holds a patent and the other has made
investments; and
• between investment and patent litigation: in an industry with high patent intensity,
there is litigation only with low investment profiles, E = (1, 0)/(0, 1).
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4 Hold-up and Strategic Patenting
Let us now move back to the investment and patenting stages. In this section, we are
interested in the impact of defensive patenting on the patenting game and the equilib-
rium investment performance. The main discussion proceeds with ex post licensing.
Interim and ex ante licensing are analyzed in section 4.4. Section 4.3 discusses some
robustness issues.
4.1 Investment
We use firms’ investment criteria to examine patents’ two-fold effects on the level and
strategic property of investment.
 Investment criteria: Consider the possible outcomes of the patenting stage.
⋄ No patents: P = (0, 0), Fi invests if c ≤ c
∗
e ≡ v1e − v0e, where e ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2.
Investments are strategic complements (hereafter SC) if c∗0 < c
∗
1, i.e. one firm’s invest-
ment increases the other’s incentive to invest; and strategic substitutes (hereafter SS)
if c∗0 > c
∗
1 .
⋄ Low patent intensity: under, e.g. P = (1, 0), the patent-holder F1’s investment cost
cutoffs remain at c∗e2 , since it faces no infringement threat.
17 The non-patentee F2 has
lower investment incentives since a suit follows its investment. Given e1, F2 invests
if c ≤ ce1 ≡ c
∗
e1
− (α f + L) < c∗e1 . The strategic property of investment is unaffected,
though. c1 is greater (smaller) than c0 if c
∗
1 is greater (smaller, respectively) than c
∗
0 .
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⋄ High patent intensity P = (1, 1): when the other firm doesn’t invest, one’s own
patent becomes useless and hold-up concerns persist. The investment criterion is
c0. When the other invests, although the truce equilibrium secures a firm its full
investment return, investment incentives are still lower than under no patent, due
to the benefit α f − L from acting as a pure licensor. The investment criterion is
cˆ ≡ c∗1 − (α f − L). From Assumption 2 , c1 < cˆ ≤ c
∗
1 . A firm may find it more prof-
itable not to invest, but instead take the “lean and hungry look” strategy and grab the
other’s investment return through a patent attack. In other words, a firm may prefer
17An implicit assumption is that the value of investment is not affected by whether there is patent dispute
or not.
18Again, this hinges on the binary investment assumption. See footnote 13.
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to be a “patent troll,” i.e. a patent-holding entity engages in no production activities
but aggressively enforces the IPRs in order to collect licensing payments.
In this case, the strategic property of investment may exhibit a one-way change.
Since cˆ − c0 = c
∗
1 − c
∗
0 + 2L, SC ensues as long as c
∗
0 < c
∗
1 + 2L. Indeed, with L
so large that c∗1 < c
∗
0 < c
∗
1 + 2L, investment decisions are SS when P 6= (1, 1) but
SC when P = (1, 1). Although the rival’s investment reduces the intrinsic value of
one’s own investment (v11 − v01 < v10 − v00), it also eliminates the threat of patent
attack. This boosts investment incentives by the amount α f + L, and outweighs the
gains of the “lean and hungry look” strategy α f − L. The litigation-induced increment
of investment incentives, 2L, more than compensates the negative externality and
transforms investments into SC at P = (1, 1).
Proposition 1. When patents are introduced,
• investment incentives decrease because of the hold-up threat (ce < c
∗
e ), and the appro-
priation of the other firm’s investment return (cˆ ≤ c∗1); and
• investment decisions may be transformed from SS into SC, but not the other way
around. There are cases where c∗0 > c
∗
1 and cˆ > c0, but exist no cases where c
∗
1 > c
∗
0 and
cˆ < c0.
Remark 3. All three thresholds c0, c1, and cˆ are non-negative due to Assumption 2(ii)
and the costlessly “switch off” assumption.19 When a firm decides whether to switch
off its investment and retreat from a potential litigation, it is as if the investment were
costless. The no retreat condition implies that firms invest in the absence of invest-
ment cost: ce ≥ 0. ‖
The following corollary performs comparative statics with respect to the institu-
tional parameters α and L.
Corollary 2. Concerning investment incentives, (i) ce are decreasing both in α and L; and (ii)
cˆ is decreasing in α but increasing in L.
For (i), more powerful patents (α higher) or more expensive law suits (L larger)
exacerbate the hold-up problem. For (ii), the attractiveness of a “lean and hungry
look” strategy depends on the expected return from offensive enforcement. A higher
α increases this return; but a higher L reduces the return and dissuades a firm from
adopting this strategy, and so boosts investment incentives.
19c∗0 and c
∗
1 ≥ 0 by Assumption 1.
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p2
0 1
p1
0 (1, 1) (0, 1)
1 (1, 0) (1, 1)
Table 1: Investment profile E for intermediate c
 Investment outcome: To derive the prevailing investment profile for each P,
let’s ignore the uninteresting case of no investment because c is too large (c > max{c∗0 , c
∗
1}).
When c ≤ min{c0, c1}, patents don’t impede investment; E = (1, 1) is the unique out-
come. When c is in the intermediate range, c ∈ (min{c0, c1},max{c
∗
0 , c
∗
1}], multiple
patterns could emerge, but we consider only the scenario specified in Table 1.20 It ap-
plies as long as c1 < c ≤ min{cˆ, c
∗
0}, whether c
∗
0 ≷ c
∗
1 .
21 In that case, both firms invest
when no patent, P = (0, 0). If only one firm has patented, P = (1, 0) or (0, 1), the
hold-up concern deters the non-patentee’s investment. However, defensive patenting
fully solves the hold-up threat, and there are no strong incentives to play “lean and
hungry look.” E = (1, 1) is restored at P = (1, 1).22 The selection of high investment
profile at high patent intensity could be justified by firms’ desire to safeguard invest-
ments and so pursue defensive patenting to preserve their freedom of operation (see
the introduction). There is no patent troll in the industry, and so a high investment
level results from the deterrence of potential patent disputes.23
Example 2. (Multiple-product competition, continued). When P 6= (1, 1), investment
decisions are strategically neutral. c∗e = ∆v ≡ c
∗ and ce = ∆v− (α f + L) ≡ c, with e ∈
20 The complete characterization is provided in Appendix C. Note that even when c < cˆ at P = (1, 1),
there may be multiple equilibria in investment. In particular, when c0 < c < cˆ, both E = (1, 1) and (0, 0)
could be equilibrium outcomes (e.g. case 3 in the appendix). Given our interests in firms with strong
investment propensities, we select E = (1, 1) in all these cases.
21For example, when c1 < cˆ < c0 < c
∗
1 < c
∗
0 or when c0 < c1 < cˆ < c
∗
0 < c
∗
1 , and for both cases if
c ∈ (c1, cˆ]. In the latter case, we select E = (1, 1) at P = (1, 1); see footnote 20.
22An interesting case omitted here is the impact of the defensive party’s underinvestment on the offensive
party’s investment incentives. The latter’s enforcement may backfire when c∗0 < c
∗
1 . For example, consider
case 6 in Appendix C, and select the high investment profile at P = (0, 0) and (1, 1). At P = (1, 0), the
defensive firm F2 doesn’t invest; and this in turn decreases F1’s return on investment to the point that no
one invests, E = (0, 0). When the investment decision is interpreted as the decision to commercialize the
basic technology, this captures the situation where no one enters into the commercialization stage and the
technologies are put idle when only one firm patents.
23In empirical studies, e.g. Hall and Ziedonis (2001), patent numbers are usually treated as the dependent
variable and investment as the explanatory variable. This implies a timing different from ours. Neverthe-
less, these two variables exhibit a positive and significant statistical relationship.
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{0, 1} and f = (1+γ)∆v2 . When P = (1, 1), they become SC, for cˆ = ∆v− (α f − L) > c.
Firms always invest if c ≤ c. Table 1 applies for c ∈ (c, cˆ]. ‖
4.2 Patenting
We now characterize the equilibrium of the whole game with respect to the endog-
enized strategic relationship of patenting decisions. Again, c > max{c∗0 , c
∗
1} is the
uninteresting case where no firms apply for patents because no one invests.
 Strategic property of patents: Corresponding to different ranges of investment
costs, we can figure out two benefits of holding a defensive patent. Ignore the patent-
ing cost K for a moment. By symmetry, we write down only F1’s payoffs.
Staunching: When an offensive patent extracts licensing payment, this outlay, to-
gether with the legal expense, can be avoided by holding a defensive patent. This
applies when investments are not impeded by patents, c ≤ min{c0, c1}. See Table 2
for payoffs. In this scenario, different P’s at most involve a zero-sum transfer between
firms, plus legal expenses. So long as L > 0, the non-patenting party loses more
than what the patent-holder gains, α f + L > α f − L. Put differently, the patent has a
greater defensive value α f + L than the offensive value α f − L. Patents are SC.
p2
0 1
p1
0 v11 − c v11 − c− (α f + L)
1 v11 − c+ (α f − L) v11 − c
Table 2: Payoffs for small c
Proposition 2. (Staunching) Assume costless patenting. In an industry where high invest-
ment profile is not impeded by patents, if the truce equilibrium prevails, then patenting deci-
sions are SC.
In this case, the value of a patent is increasing in the infringement probability α. On the
other hand, a higher litigation cost L increases the defensive value, but decreases the offensive
value of a patent.
Emboldening: When the rival’s offensive patent is powerful enough, no firm dares
invest without the aid of a defensive patent. Consider min{c0, c1} < c ≤ max{c
∗
0 , c
∗
1}
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and assume that investment outcomes are as described in Table 1, with payoffs in
Table 3. Note that no litigation takes place along the equilibrium path.
p2
0 1
p1
0 v11 − c v01
1 v10 − c v11 − c
Table 3: Payoffs for intermediate c
In contrast with the previous scenario, here, firms’ patenting decisions are driven
by investment concerns. An offensive patent has the strategic value of deterring the
other’s investment, with a benefit v10 − v11 ≥ 0; and a defensive patent safeguards
firms’ own investment return v11 − v01 − c. Comparing the two, patents are SC if
v11 − v01 − c > v10 − v11, or if V11 − c > V10. The strategic property of patents is
determined by whether a low (E = (1, 0)/(0, 1)) or high (E = (1, 1)) investment
profile gives rise to a greater joint profit!
Since it is required that c ∈ (min{c0, c1},max{c
∗
0 , c
∗
1}], a necessary condition of SC
(equivalently, a sufficient condition of SS if this condition fails) is:
min{c0, c1} < V11 −V10 ⇒ min{0, (v10 − v00)− (v11 − v01)}+ (v10 − v11) < α f + L. (3)
It is more likely to hold if patents are more powerful (α higher) or if litigations are
more expensive (L higher).
Proposition 3. (Emboldening) Assume costless patenting. Consider an industry where high
investment profile is maintained under either no patent or high patent intensity, and low
patent intensity causes low investment profile. In this case, higher α and L make patents more
likely to be SC. To determine the strategic property of patenting decisions, there is
• a necessary and sufficient condition: patents are SC (SS) if and only if V11− c is greater
(smaller, respectively) than V10;
• a sufficient condition of SS: if condition (3) fails, patents are SS.
Remark 4. For emboldening, when is the condition V11 − c > V10 more likely to hold?
Since we assume negative externality (ve1 ≤ ve0), the individual investment return
needs to be large enough to compensate for this effect, (v11 − v01)− (v10 − v11) > c. ‖
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Example 3. (Multi-product competition, continued). Suppose c ∈ (c, cˆ] so that Table
3 applies. From V11 − V10 = (1 − γ)∆v > c, condition (3) is satisfied. Also, cˆ ≷
(1− γ)∆v. Both SS and SC are possible. Patents are SC if c < (1− γ)∆v: when the
substitutability between the two new versions is small, and so the competition is not
severe (γ small); or when there is great technology improvement (∆v large). ‖
Remark 5. In a more general setting, e.g. with a continuous investment choice, the two
benefits of a defensive patent, staunching and emboldening, may co-exist. Our insights
would carry over to the mixed case: a higher enforcement cost or a greater joint profit
from larger investments move patents toward SC. ‖
 Equilibrium: Let us incorporate the patenting cost K and consider its relation-
ship with the equilibrium investment outcome.
Corollary 3. In equilibrium, when patents are SC,24 the high investment profile is the unique
investment outcome. The industry exhibits high patent intensity for low K, and no patent for
high K.
When patents are SS, this gives rise to different E’s, yielding a non-monotonic relationship
of investment with K. The equilibrium E = (1, 1) for either low K and high patent intensity,
or high K and no patent in the industry in equilibrium. But when K is in an intermediate
range, so that low patent intensity prevails in equilibrium, then only the patent-holder invests.
Merges (1997) has depicted the patenting situation in the software industry as a
prisoners’ dilemma game: it is a dominant strategy for each firm to pursue patents,
despite their joint interests in not doing so. Our model shows this is the case when
patents are SC and the patenting cost K is low. With SC and K in the intermediate
range, patenting becomes a coordination game: no one has a dominant strategy, mul-
tiple equilibria exist, and they can be Pareto ranked. In this case, P = (0, 0) and
(1, 1) have the same subgame perfect equilibrium in the remaining of the game. But
the equilibrium P = (1, 1) is Pareto dominated by P = (0, 0) due to the expenditure
in accumulating patents K. When high patent intensity prevails, firms jump on the
bandwagon to engage in socially wasteful patent collection.
In the case of SS, things are rather different. The investment profile is sensitive
to the patenting equilibrium, and joint profit maximization may require that one firm
24This could happen for both staunching and emboldening; SS happens only for the emboldening sce-
nario.
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refrains from investing. To see this, note that when K < v11 − v01 − c, the equilibrium
joint profit is V11 − 2c − 2K since both firms patent and invest. If the patenting cost
raises to a level K′ ∈ (v11 − v01 − c, v10 − v11], then the joint profit is V10 − c− K
′. As
long as K′ − 2K < V10 + c − V11, the industry-wide profit increases, albeit a higher
patenting cost K′ > K.
Remark 6. Without specifying consumer demand, we cannot provide a thorough wel-
fare analysis. Nevertheless, a rather bold claim from Corollary 3 is that: the patent
systemwould not be in the optimal state if it endows patents with the property of SC.
Besides the administrative costs, firms can, at best, succeed in coordinating not to pur-
sue patents. At worst, resources are expended in patenting to maintain the situation
as when there are no patents. ‖
4.3 Remarks
Remark 7. (War equilibrium) None of our results survive if the war equilibrium is
selected in the subgame following P = E = (1, 1). To see this, note that when the
war equilibrium prevails, investment incentives remain low even when both hold a
patent. The cost cutoff for Fi at P = (1, 1) and ej = 1 is c1 < cˆ, the same as when Fi has
no patent. And the strategic property of investments is not affected by patents.
At the patenting stage, patents become strategically neutral when c ≤ min{c0, c1},
and Table 1 is not feasible as equilibrium outcomeswhenmin{c0, c1} < c ≤ max{c
∗
0 , c
∗
1}.
For the former case, the staunching effect disappears: each firm spends 2L in a litiga-
tion war, and by symmetry there is no licensing transfer in expectation. For the latter,
the emboldening scenario doesn’t take place since, for example, if F2 doesn’t invest at
P = (1, 0) due to F1’s patent threat, getting one patent and then engage in a litigation
war doesn’t help either. ‖
Remark 8. (Alternative market conditions) Let’s relax two assumptions for robustness
check. First, suppose that the condition V11 ≥ V10 ≥ V00 fails. For example, when the
two firms compete in a single product market, and ei is Fi’s entry decision, in general
we would expect monopoly profit to be higher than joint duopoly profit. Previous
studies by Bessen (2003), Me´nie`re and Parlane (2004) are conducted in this case. It
would be interesting to see whether our results survive this modification.
With some qualifications, our insights carry over to the alternative environment. A
truce equilibrium exists when the legal expense L is high enough; and the two forces
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identified above exert the same effects on the strategic property of patents. A higher
Lmakes SCmore likely; and since joint profits are always higher when only one firm
invests (enters), patents are more likely to be SS. In particular, when Table 1 applies,
SS is guaranteed. In this sense, the single-product assumption is more restrictive (for
a thorough discussion, see Appendix D.
Second, suppose Assumption 2(ii) doesn’t hold. Let v01 > v11 − (α f + L) and
c ≤ c∗0. Then at P = (1, 0) the non-patenting firm will retreat when facing a litigation
threat, and so will not invest in the first place. This is true even for c close to zero. A
potential patent dispute alone deters investment. Table 3 describes the payoffs, and
Proposition 3 and Corollary 3 apply directly. ‖
4.4 Alternative Licensing Opportunities
We consider alternative licensing opportunities here. The interim licensing (licensing
after investments are made but before litigation phase) illustrates the role of the en-
forcement cost in our model; and for ex ante licensing (licensing before the investment
but after the patenting stage), we show that firms can exploit this opportunity to co-
ordinate investment decisions. In this sense, patents together with ex ante licensing
facilitate upstream collusion.
 Interim licensing: In general, it is cheaper to resolve legal disputes out of court.
We first consider the extreme case of costless interim bargaining.
At the enforcement subgame, when there is litigation, for example, when e2 = 1
and only F1 holds a patent, at the interim bargaining the joint profit at threat point is
Ve11 − 2L, and the cooperative joint profit is Ve11. The bargaining surplus is the litiga-
tion expense 2L. With equal bargaining power, each firm saves its litigation cost by
participating in interim licensing. Payoffs are the same as putting L = 0 in the previ-
ous discussion. On the other hand, if no litigation would ever occur, firms wouldn’t
bother bargaining. The truce equilibrium is robust to interim licensing.
For investment thresholds, {c∗e }e=0,1 are unaffected by interim licensing; while
{ce}e=0,1 increase to c
in.
e ≡ c
∗
e − α f . The saving of L decreases the defensive party’s
loss from a patent attack and boosts incentives. But now the cutoff cˆ decreases to
c∗1 − α f = c
in.
1 . Since there is no need to actually incur the enforcement expense,
the “lean and hungry look” strategy becomes more attractive. This adjustment makes
Table 1, and therefore the emboldening scenario almost impossible to attain. To see
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this, suppose E depends on P.25 To have E = (1, 0) at P = (1, 0), the non-patenting
player F2 doesn’t invest when c > c
in.
1 . But to have E = (1, 1) at P = (1, 1), to induce,
say, e1 = 1, we need c ≤ c
in.
1 . Table 1 applies only when c = c
in.
1 and firms decide
whether to invest “correctly.” For Proposition 2,26 on the other hand, it is clear that
under interim licensing, L = 0 and so patents become strategically neutral.
Proposition 4. Suppose interim licensing is available at no cost. In the staunching scenario,
patenting are strategically neutral. The emboldening scenario is feasible only when c = cin.1
and firms invest if and only if they hold a patent.
Nevertheless, all this holds true only for costless interim licensing. Previous re-
sults are re-gained for any strictly positive bargaining cost, since it could simply be
interpreted as L. This confirms that our results are driven by the enforcement cost.
Interim bargaining costs may come from contracting costs, including the man-
agement time and efforts spent in negotiating and crafting out appropriate licensing
terms, or lawyer fees up to the pre-trial settlement. Or, it may be due to some infor-
mational asymmetry at the interim bargaining stage, as Bebchuk (1984) (see Appendix
E).
 Ex ante licensing: Suppose no interim licensing and L > 0, but firms can bar-
gain before the investment stage with a lower cost l ∈ [0, L]. Different from the in-
terim licensing, the ex ante bargaining can not only resolve future patent disputes in a
less expensive way, but also coordinate non-contractible investment decisions.27 This
coordination can be achieved by not granting a license, so that a potential infringer re-
frains from investing. Apparently, this is possible only in the emboldening scenario,
where the investment performance depends on the patenting profile; see the follow-
ing proposition.28
Proposition 5. Suppose ex ante licensing is available at a cost l ∈ [0, L], and c is in the
intermediate range with payoffs in Table 3,
25The condition is c ∈ (min{cin.0 , c
in.
1 }, max{c
∗
0 , c
∗
1}].
26The corresponding condition now is c ≤ min{cin.0 , c
in.
1 }.
27With a different theoretical model, Siebert and von Graevenitz (2005) finds empirical evidence that in-
deed firms choose different licensing timing in order to affect investment incentives.
28In the staunching scenario, since firms make investments whatever the patent profile, the ex ante licens-
ing is used only to economize on enforcement costs when l < L.
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(i) under low patent intensity, an ex ante license is granted only for the case where, at the
patenting stage, patents are SC, and l ≤ 12(V11 − c−V10);
(ii) under high patent intensity and l > 0, no cross-license is observed. When patents
are SC, no licenses are granted; but when patents are SS, the only possible outcome
is a one-way license followed by the low investment profile. This happens when l ≤
1
2 [V10 − (V11 − c)].
5 Patent versus Trade Secret
Up to now, we have only considered the “downstream” phase in the R&D cycle. That
is, we assume that firms already hold the basic inventions and no technology ex-
change is needed.29 Since the patent system is designed to provide incentives at the
“upstream” stage, i.e. to encourage innovation and its dissemination, it is desirable to
examine the impact of defensive patenting on this ground.
We argue that defensive patenting may be detrimental to the very purposes of
the patent system. For, as an incentive scheme, the reward of the patent system is
implemented via offensive enforcement, but this is incompatible with the deterrence
power of the truce equilibrium, in which no patentees earn any licensing income. To
illustrate this point, consider the following scenario.
Suppose, in addition to technology A1, F1 owns another technology B that is valu-
able to F2. The joint profit is also higher if B is used by F2, but uncompensated revela-
tion harms F1. Assume trade secrecy provides perfect protection, but foregoes licens-
ing opportunity. To induce disclosure, the patent system should serve as an effective
mechanism for F1 to share the benefit of technology flow. The incentive power of the
patent system is determined by the licensing payment F1 can extract from F2.
Assume B is patentable with considerable strength. In the absence of a countersuit,
F1 gets enough licensing payment by patenting and disclosing it. Label the situation
as a “weak” patent regime, where defensive patenting is not available to F2. Now,
imagine a policy shift to the “strong” patent regime, where F2 can build a defensive
patent based on A2. If the truce equilibrium prevails in the strong regime, then F1 will
switch to trade secrecy protection for technology B after a regime shift. The incentive
power of the patent system is lower and technology flow hampered in the strong
29But note that another interpretation of ei is the second-stage innovation effort. By this token, previous
analysis focuses on the effect of patents on the second-stage innovation, given the first-stage has completed.
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patent regime.
The regime shift we have in mind is the U.S. patent reform in 1980s. Section 1 de-
scribes how this “pro-patent” reform facilitates the accumulation of a patent portfolio
with non-negligible power, and makes it easier to implement the defensive patenting
strategy. Through this example, we argue that despite the general agreement that this
reform has strengthened the patent system, it may nevertheless have undermined the
incentive power of the patent system, as a consequence of defensive patenting.
Wemodify the basic model as follows. For simplicity, we exclude ex ante or interim
licensing, set K = c = 0, and assume firms always invest. Suppose that each firm at
most files one infringement suit due to, e.g., a large L. This implies that each firm at
most applies for one patent. If B is not patented, it is protected as a trade secret, which
has no leakage risk, but enables no licensing either, due to, say, the Arrow problem.
Since only technology B will be copied without permission, it is reasonable to let the
probability to infringe B, αB, be greater than the probability to infringe technologies
A1 and A2 (which assumed a common αA). Let α = (αA, αB). Under the “weak”
patent regime, α = (0, αB) and αB > 0. Under the “strong” regime, α
′ = (α′A, α
′
B), with
α′A > 0 and α
′
B > max{α
′
A, αB}. Later we will consider the case α
′ = α+ (∆α,∆α), i.e.
the regime shift exhibits a uniform increase in infringement probability.
Firms incorporate all the disclosed information into its investment: F1 uses both
A1 and B; and F2 uses A2 and in addition B if it is patented and disclosed.
30 Revenues
depend on both the investment profile and technologies employed. When B is not
available to F2, nothing changes: Fi get veie j if E = (ei, ej), and suppose Assumption
1 holds. When B is patented, given e1, (i) if e2 = 0, F1 still gets ve10 and F2 gets v0e1 ;
but (ii) if e2 = 1, the access to technology B increases F2’s as well as the joint profit,
while decreases F1’s revenue. Assume that F1 gets βve11 and F2 gets bv1e1 , respectively,
with β ≤ 1 ≤ b. By β ≤ 1, the technology B is covered as a trade secret if F1 is not
properly compensated for its disclosure. The following assumption guarantees that
information disclosure and full investment utilization are in line with joint interests,
and no one retreats from a litigation threat.31
30Since joint profit maximization requires B to be utilized by F2, whenever B is patented it will employ
this invention before a license is negotiated. At worst, F2 pays a licensing fee; but if no infringement, the
technology is free to use.
31After the modification of payoffs, at different ex post bargaining: (i) when F2 infringes, the joint profit
at threat points are V10 if F1 doesn’t infringe, and V00 if mutual blocking, whether B is accessible to F2
or not. V10 also applies when only F1 infringes, but B is not patented. On the other hand, if F1 patents
B, but becomes the only infringing party, threat point payoffs are βv01 for F1 and bv10 for F2; and (ii) the
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Assumption 3. β+ b ≥ 2, and (β+ b)v11 ≥ βv01 + bv10 ≥ V00.
 Patenting: We first consider patenting decisions in different regimes. Under a
weak regime, α = (0, αB), no firms patent Ai. The patent protection αB should be high
enough to induce patenting B.
Lemma 3. Under a weak patent regime, no firm patents Ai. Given F2 not retreats, F1 patents
B if
αB
2
[(b− β)v11 + (v10 − v01)]− L ≥ (1− β)v11. (4)
The term
αβ
2 (b− β)v11 in condition (4) reflects the contribution of B to F2, netting
of the negative impact on F1, and is transferred to F1 through the licensing payment.
In the strong patent regime, α′ = (α′A, α
′
B) > α. F2 decides whether to get a patent;
F1 chooses between two patentable inventions with different exclusive powers.
32 If
B is not patented, results at section 4 directly apply, with e1 = e2 = 1. Payoffs are
the same as in Table 2, with c = 0 and α = α′A. Since no patenting costs, acquiring
a patent weakly dominates having no patent.33 But if B is patented, when α′A is high
enough so that A2 endows F2 a creditable countersuing threat, this threat decreases
F1’s enforcement payoff and reduces the incentive to engage in a litigation war. The
following lemma gives the condition when there is a litigation war.34
Lemma 4. Suppose B and A2 are patented. When countersuing threats are credible and no
firms retreat from a litigation war, F1 initiates a litigation war if
1
2
{
α′B[(b− β)v11 + (v10 − v01)]− α
′
A
{
α′B(v10 − v01)
+ (1− α′B) [(bv10 − βv01)− (b− β)v11]
}}
≥ 2L.
(5)
cooperation joint profits are (β+ b)v11 if B is patented, and V11 if not.
32The implicit assumption is that, as a true inventor, F1 should be abler than F2 to generate patents. And
so when the latter can be granted a less valuable patent (A2), so can F1.
33If
α′A
2 (v10 − v01) < L, so that a patent of Ai is irrelevant, it makes no harm to have one. But if
α′A
2 (v10 −
v01) ≥ L, it is strictly better to have a patent.
34We consider only the case in which F1 has a positive expected licensing income from a war. Since this
expected income is zero-sum between the two parties, and by patenting A1 the truce equilibrium prevails,
if this is not true, F1 can guarantee itself a higher payoff by patenting A1.
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 Policy shift and technology flow: Suppose F1 patents B under a weak regime,
and patenting Ai dominates no patent strategy under a strong regime. After the
regime shift, F1 switches to patent A1 and technology flow is terminated if: (i) the
truce equilibrium prevails and so F1 is not compensated for disclosing B; or (ii) F1
still gets positive profit from a litigation war, but the gain is smaller than the loss of
technology disclosure (1− β)v11. The following numerical example covers both cases.
Example 4. Assume a uniform regime shift, α′B = αB + ∆α and α
′
A = ∆α. And consider
the following set of parameters: αB =
1
3 , β = .99, b = 1.2, v11 = 100, v10 = 120, v00 =
v01 = 0, and L = 13. With these values, B is patented at the weak regime and no firm
would suspend its investment when facing a litigation war.
Figure 2 summarizes F1’s patenting decision over ∆α ∈ [0,
2
3 ].
35 Patenting A1 se-
cures a payoff 100 for F1; and the thick line represents its payoff when patenting B.
Comparing the two, the optimal decision is non-monotonic in ∆α: F1 patents B when
∆α ∈ [0, .21) or [.35, 23 ], but for ∆α ∈ [.21, .35), it switches to A1.
∆α
0
profit
99 = βv11
100 = v11
.21 .25 .35 23
patenting Bpatenting B patenting A1
Figure 2: Patent Power and Patenting Decision
In this example, defensive patenting is not available until ∆α exceeds .21. Before
that level, only F1 benefits from a general strengthening of patent rights and gets more
licensing payment from F2. When ∆α ≥ .21, a patent on A2 is powerful enough
and any enforcement leads to a litigation war. For ∆α not large enough,36 either the
35With these parameter values, F1 has no incentives to bring two suits, and so won’t patent both.
36If F1 still patents B, from the left-hand side of inequality (5), the expected gain from a war (the expected
licensing fee) is increasing in ∆α with chosen values.
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truce equilibrium prevails (for ∆α ∈ [.21, .25)); or the positive gain from a war cannot
compensate for the loss of disclosing B (for ∆α ∈ [.25, .35)). F1 switches to patent A1
and protects B as a trade secret. Only when ∆α ≥ .35 will F1 patent B again.
37 ‖
Proposition 6. When patent rights are strengthened, the number of patents (weakly) increases
but a firm may switch to trade secrecy for its valuable inventions. The information dissemina-
tion may be hampered.
Again, two non-monotonic relationshipsmay be observed: when the patent power
is enhanced uniformly by ∆α, technology flow and patent enforcementmay take place
only for high or low values of ∆α, and are eliminated for intermediate values of ∆α.
6 Concluding Remarks
In a sense, we have revealed the “dark side” of defensive patenting in this paper, in
spite of the general appraisal of safeguarding firms’ freedom of operation. In par-
ticular, we have confirmed the worry that firms jump on the bandwagon to engage
in socially wasteful patent accumulation (Corollary 3); and that an increase of patent
power may weaken the incentive power of the patent system, as a consequence of
defensive patenting (Proposition 6).
Since the premise of defensive patenting is the ability to build a patent portfolio
with non-negligible infringement probability, our results support the argument that
the “flooding” of a large amount of low-quality yet powerful patents should be partly
responsible for, in Jaffe and Lerner’s words, a “broken” U.S. patent system. And, two
ingredients of the U.S. patent reform play critical roles: the USPTO’s issuing more
patents with arguably lower quality, and the CAFC’s greater willingness to uphold
issued patents.
In an influential paper, Lemley (2001) argues that, instead of spending more re-
sources on each application at the patent office, it would be more efficient to let pri-
vate parties select which patents are worth detailed examination through expensive
litigation since, from empirical experience, most granted patents are not economically
important for they are never licensed or enforced. And so the author asserts that, de-
spite critiques, the current quality control within USPTO may be optimal.
37The threshold .21 is determined by the condition such that F2 has a credible countersuing threat; .25 by
condition (5) binding; and .35 by the profit from a litigation war equals one ((1− β)v11 = 1).
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One problem with this reasoning is its very starting point. The example in section
5 shows that a valuable patent could be buried in a truce equilibrium and classified
as “economically unimportant” according to Lemley (2001) precisely after the PTO
started issuing low-quality patents and the court raised the validity of patents. But the
fact that these patents have not been enforced doesn’t make them irrelevant. There-
fore, if the CAFC maintains its position of high presumed validity, the calculation
should tilt toward weeding out bad patents within the patent office.
For future research, an interesting topic is to integrate the concerns raised in this
paper into the optimal patent design, for instance, the optimal scope under defensive
patenting. Previous literature on cumulative innovation (e.g. Green and Scotchmer
(1995), Chang (1995)) has ignored the second-generation inventor’s ability to build a
defensive patent portfolio against the enforcement from first-generation. In that way,
it propounds the view that increasing the patent power unambiguously benefits the
latter. If the first-generation inventor is also a technology user, this might no longer
be true. It would be desirable to see whether established results in the literature are
robust to the introduction of defensive patenting.
Finally, if we stick to costless enforcement, the fact that there may be no high in-
vestment under high patent intensity (Proposition 4, for c in the intermediate range)
begs the question: whether patents create too strong incentives for playing the “lean
and hungry look” strategy. Alternatively, whether the patent system induces the op-
timal vertical disintegration, e.g. the entry of design-specialized firms in the semi-
conductor industry, who have no manufacturing capacity and presumably less vul-
nerable to patent threats. We need an ownership model to discuss these issues, and
leave for future research.
Appendix
A Proofs
 Lemma 1
Proof. By Assumption 1, vˆe10 ≥ vˆe11, F1 credibly exercises its injunctive power absent
a license. At the threat point, revenue stream is vˆe10 for F1 and vˆ0e1 for F2. There is
bargaining surplus for cooperative joint revenue stream is vˆe11 + vˆ1e1 . The two parties
agree to exploit F2’s investment, and the investment outcome is E = (e1, 1). Note
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that e1 affects the magnitude of the bargaining surplus, but not the licensing fee: by
splitting equally the bargaining surplus, F1 gets
∫
∞
T1
[
vˆe10 +
vˆe11 + vˆ1e1 − vˆe10 − vˆ0e1
2
]
e−rtdt =
(
ve11 +
ve10 + v1e1 − ve11 − v0e1
2
)
e−rT1 . (6)
Let f ≡ 12(ve10+ v1e1 − ve11− v0e1) =
1
2(v10− v01), the same for both e1 = 0, 1. Q.E.D.
 Lemma 2
Proof. Partition the enforcement stage into intervals with equal length ∆ > 0, and
suppose F1 can bring a suit at 2n∆ and F2 at (2n + 1)∆, with n = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Let F1
bring the first suit at time T1 = N1∆,N1 ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}. F2’s enforcement date is
T2 = N2∆, N2 ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . .}, with N2 ≥ N1 + 1.
38 Consider possible events at T1.
⋄ With probability 1 − α, the court finds F1’s patent not infringed and no bargain-
ing takes place. During [T1, T2) the prevailing investment profile is E = (1, 1) and
each firm gets vˆ11. At time T2, F2 executes its patent attack against F1. By Lemma 1,
expected payoffs are:
π1−α1 =
∫ T2
T1
vˆ11e
−rtdt+ α
∫
∞
T2
(vˆ11 − fˆ )e
−rtdt+ (1− α)
∫
∞
T2
vˆ11e
−rtdt− L(e−rT1 + e−rT2)
= (v11 − L)e
−rT1 − (α f + L)e−rT2, (7)
π1−α2 = (v11 − L)e
−rT1 + (α f − L)e−rT2, (8)
where fˆ = 12 (vˆ10 − vˆ01). By Assumption 2, the optimal T2 = T1 + ∆.
⋄With probability α, F2 infringes F1’s paten and the two bargain. For the threat point
payoffs, absent agreement, F2 is prohibited from using the investment. Over the pe-
riod [T1, T2), the stream of revenue is vˆ10 to F1 and vˆ01 to F2. At T2, F2 countersues.
Again, with probability 1 − α the court finds no infringement, E = (1, 0) prevails
forever; with probability α, F2’s patent is infringed, the two firms meet and bargain
again.
If the bargain fails again, F2 exerts its injunctive power and there is mutual block-
ing, E = (0, 0). In an agreement, the two firms may be able to restore ex post efficiency,
E = (1, 1); or previous bargaining failure persists and only E = (1, 0) is feasible. The
38T2 could be chosen contingent on whether F2 infringes F1’s patent. But for both events countersuing
reduces to a unilateral enforcement. The optimal suing dates are the same.
27
results are the same in either case,39 andwe proceedwith the former, i.e. the two firms
reach a cross-license at T2. By symmetry, no balance payment is made, and each firm
gets a stream value of vˆ11. Summing up, the threat point joint payoff at T1’s bargaining
is (V10 − 2L)e
−rT1 + [α(V11 −V10)− 2L]e
−rT2 for each gets
πth.1 =
∫ T2
T1
vˆ10e
−rtdt+ α
∫
∞
T2
vˆ11e
−rtdt+ (1− α)
∫
∞
T2
vˆ10e
−rtdt− L(e−rT1 + e−rT2)
= (v10 − L)e
−rT1 + [α(v11 − v10)− L]e
−rT2 , (9)
πth.2 = (v01 − L)e
−rT1 + [α(v11 − v01)− L]e
−rT2 . (10)
Next, consider the cooperative profit at T1. By assumption a license covers only
F1’s patent. At T2 a suit is brought by F2 against F1, but a license is secured following
the infringement judgement. E = (1, 1) is maintained over the whole period [T1,∞),
with joint profit V11e
−rT1 − 2L(e−rT1 + e−rT2). The bargaining surplus at T1, then, is
V11e
−rT1 − 2L(e−rT1 + e−rT2)−
{
(V10 − 2L)e
−rT1 + [α(V11 −V10)− 2L]e
−rT2
}
=(V11−V10)e
−rT1 − α(V11 −V10)e
−rT2 ≥ 0.
(11)
A license is granted, and the expected payoffs when F1 prevails at T1 are:
πα1 = (v10 − L)e
−rT1 + [α(v11 − v10)− L]e
−rT2 +
1
2
[
(V11 −V10)e
−rT1 − α(V11 −V10)e
−rT2)
]
= (v11 + f − L)e
−rT1 − (α f + L)e−rT2, (12)
πα2 = (v11 − f − L)e
−rT1 + (α f − L)e−rT2. (13)
Again the optimal T2 = T1 + ∆. It is then straightforward to derive firms’ expected
payoffs. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 1
Proof. Given ∆ > 0. Lemma 2(i) guarantees the optimality of counter-suing. Consider
F1’s decision at time T1 for filing the first suit, conditional on F2’s strategy.
⋄War equilibrium: If enforcement is decided in a non-strategicmanner, then each firm
sues at the earliest possible dates. To show this is an equilibrium, by suing first at T1,
F1 gets π
s
1 according to Lemma 2; if F1 deviates and not sues, since the equilibrium
39Knowing what investment outcome would emerge should they fail to license at T1, the bargaining
surplus as well as the threat point are adjusted accordingly. The impact is equally shared between two
players, and so the two scenarios end up with the same payoffs.
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strategy requires F2 to sue at time T1+∆, whatever F1 does, this deviation only delays
a litigation war. F1 loses its first-mover advantage and gets a payoff
π′1 =
∫ T1+∆
T1
vˆ11e
−rtdt+
[
v11 − α f (1− e
−r∆)− L(1+ e−r∆)
]
e−r(T1+∆)
=
{
v11 −
[
α f (1− e−r∆) + L(1+ e−r∆)
]
e−r∆
}
e−rT1
(14)
⇒ πs1 − π
′
1 = (α f − L)(1+ e
−r∆)(1− e−r∆)e−rT1 > 0, ∀ ∆ > 0. (15)
F1 has no incentives to deviate. In equilibrium, patent disputes take place at time 0
and ∆. As ∆ → 0, the equilibrium payoff approaches to πw = v11 − 2L for both firms.
⋄ Truce equilibrium: Sticking to the equilibrium strategy of ‘tit-for-tat,’ F2 will not sue
later if F1 not sue now. F1 gets v11e
−rT1 by following the equilibrium strategy. If F1 de-
viates and sues, the expected payoff is πs1. Since v11e
−rT1−πs1 = −
[
α f (1− e−r∆)− L(1+ e−r∆)
]
e−rT1
and e−r∆ → 1 as ∆ → 0, F1 has no incentives to deviate for ∆ small enough. No litiga-
tion occurs along the equilibrium path and both firms get πt = v11. Q.E.D.
 Corollary 3
Proof. Referring to Table 2 and 3, the equilibrium at the patenting stage can be charac-
terized in terms of the strategic property of patents. Consider emboldening (Table 3).
When patents are SC, v11 − v01 − c > v10 − v11 ≥ 0, patenting gives nonnegative ben-
efits. The patenting equilibrium is: (i) if K < v10 − v11, then patenting is a dominant
strategy. P = (1, 1) is the unique equilibrium; (ii) if K ∈ [v10 − v11, v11 − v01− c], there
are two symmetric equilibria P = (0, 0) and (1, 1); and, (iii) if K > v11 − v01 − c, then
P = (0, 0) is the unique equilibrium. Whether P = (0, 0) or (1, 1), the equilibrium
investment profile is E = (1, 1).
When patents are SS, v11 − v01 − c < v10 − v11. To have E = (1, 1) at P = (1, 1), it
must be c ≤ cˆ = v11 − v01 − (α f − L), and so v11 − v01 − c ≥ α f − L ≥ 0. Patenting
is profitable. Similar to SC, the equilibrium E = (1, 1) for either K > v10 − v11 or K <
v11 − v01 − c. When K ∈ [v11 − v01 − c, v10 − v11], strategic substitutability generates
two asymmetric equilibria P = (1, 0) and (0, 1), where only the patent-holder invests
in equilibrium. E and K follows a non-monotonic relationship.
The same argument applies for staunching, where only SC is possible. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 5
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Proof. An ex ante license commits the patent-holder not to enforce her patent rights.
Under low patent intensity, joint payoffs with and without a license are V11 − 2c and
V10 − c, respectively. The condition to reach a license coincides with that of strategic
complementarity of patents.
When P = (1, 1), by truce equilibrium E = (1, 1) can be attained without bargain-
ing; no cross-licensing is needed. The only way to increase joint profit with costly
ex ante bargaining is to change the investment outcome to E = (1, 0)/(0, 1). This is
done with one-way license so that hold-up is in force. The condition leading to the
joint choice of E = (1, 1) (E = (1, 0)/(0, 1)) coincides with the condition of SC (SS,
respectively) for patents. Q.E.D.
 Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose F2 not retreats. If F1 patents B and sues F2 for infringement, with
probability 1 − αB it gets only βv11. With probability αB, there is an infringement
and a license negotiation follows. The bargaining surplus is (β+ b)v11 − V10 ≥ 0, by
Assumption 2 and 3. Patenting B leaves F1 a profit of
αB
(
v10 +
1
2
[(β+ b)v11 −V10]
)
+ (1− αB)βv11 − L; (16)
it is profitable if condition (4) holds. When B is patented, with F2’s payoff bv11 −
αB
2 [(b− β)v11 + (v10 − v01)]− L, it is easy to find F2’s no retreat condition. Q.E.D.
 Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose the reaction lag ∆ approaches to zero, and ignore for a moment the
enforcement cost 2L. When F1 initiates a litigation war, possible outcomes are
⋄With probability (1− α′A)(1− α
′
B), no infringement. F1 gets βv11 and F2 gets bv11.
⋄With probability (1− α′A)α
′
B, only F2 infringes. From Lemma 3 and αB = 1, F1 gets
βv11 +
1
2 [(b− β)v11 + (v10 − v01)], and F2 gets bv11 −
1
2 [(b− β)v11 + (v10 − v01)].
⋄With probability α′A(1− α
′
B), only F1 infringes. To negotiate a license, the threat point
profits are βv01 for F1 and bv10 for F2 (e1 is shut down). The cooperative joint profit
is (β + b)v11. Assumption 3 guarantees positive bargaining surplus. F1 gets payoff
βv11 −
1
2 [(bv10 − βv01)− (b− β)v11], and F2 gets bv11 +
1
2 [(bv10 − βv01)− (b− β)v11].
Licensing fee paid by F1 is
1
2 [(bv10 − βv01)− (b− β)v11] ≥ 0.
⋄ With probability α′Aα
′
B, a cross-license is negotiated to solve mutual blocking. The
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threat point payoff is v00 for both firms. The bargaining surplus is (β + b)v11 − V00.
Each gets 12(β+ b)v11 = bv11 −
1
2 (b− β)v11, with a balance payment
1
2(b− β)v11 from
F2 to F1.
Adding up the four events, the expected payoffs from a litigation war are: for F1,
βv11 +
α′B
2
[(b− β)v11 + (v10 − v01)]
−
α′A
2
{
α′B(v10 − v01) + (1− α
′
B) [(bv10 − βv01)− (b− β)v11]
}
− 2L,
(17)
and for F2,
bv11 −
α′B
2
[(b− β)v11 + (v10 − v01)]
+
α′A
2
{
α′B(v10 − v01) + (1− α
′
B) [(bv10 − βv01)− (b− β)v11]
}
− 2L.
(18)
The optimality of counter-suing requires
for F1:
α′B
2
[
(1− α′A)(b− β)v11 + (1− α
′
A)(v10 − v01) + α
′
A(bv10 − βv01)
]
≥ L,(19)
for F2:
α′A
2
[
α′B(v10 − v01) + (1− α
′
B)(bv10 − βv01)− (1− α
′
B)(b− β)v11
]
≥ L. (20)
Assuming both inequalities hold, and assume only F1 has a positive expected licens-
ing income, then a litigation war arises if condition (5) holds.
For no retreating, suppose F2 not retreats. If F1 switches off its investment and
eliminates the infringement risk, by suing F2, with probability 1 − α′B, F1 gets βv01.
With probability α′B, there is an infringement: the threat point profit is v00 for both;
and the cooperative joint profit is βv01 + bv10 ≥ 2v00, by Assumption 3. Dividing the
surplus equally, F1 gets
1
2(βv01 + bv10). F1’s expected payoff of suing F2 is
α′B
2
(βv01 + bv10) + (1− α
′
B)βv01 − L = βv01 +
α′B
2
(bv10 − βv01)− L. (21)
F1 won’t shut down its investment if this term is smaller than the payoff from a litiga-
tion war. Similarly, if F2 retreats by setting e2 = 0 and sues F1, the expected payoff is
v01+
α′A
2 (v10− v01)− L, by Lemma 1. Comparing it with the payoff from the litigation
war, we then get F2’s no retreat condition. Q.E.D.
B Eliminating the war equilibrium
In this appendix, we introduce asymmetric information about firms’ litigation cost as
a simple way to eliminate the Pareto dominated war equilibrium. Assume a firm is
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the ‘normal type’ with probability 1− ǫ , where payoffs are as specified in the basic
model. With probability ǫ ∈ (0, 1), however, a firms is the ‘purely defensive’ type: it
hesitates to bring the first suit, but has a credible threat to bring a countersuit.
To justify this behavior, we assume litigation exhibits scale economy for the pure-
defensive type: the second lawsuit costs less than the first one.40 As an extreme case,
suppose there is only a fixed cost L¯ for engaging in patent disputes. Assume α f <
L¯ so that it never worths the purely defensive firm to initiate the first lawsuit. But
once it has fought in the court, the marginal cost for the second suit is zero, and so a
countersuit is brought with the least delay.
Assume each firm can be one of the two types according to the identical and in-
dependent probability distribution {ǫ, 1− ǫ}. Let the type be the firm’s private infor-
mation, and this structure is common knowledge. Fix ∆ > 0 and consider the normal
type F1’s enforcement decision at time T1. F1 gets π
s
1 by suing since a countersuit is
guaranteed whatever the type of F2. If F1 chooses not to enforce its patent rights, with
probability ǫ it encounters a purely defensive rival bringing no future litigation; but
with probability 1 − ǫ the normal type F2 may employ the war strategy regardless
of F1’s wish for peace. We show that as long as ǫ is large enough, a normal type F1
doesn’t attack even if its rival of the normal type sticks to the war strategy.
Given a war from the normal type rival, if the normal type F1 waits and sees, its
expected payoff is:
ǫv11e
−rT1 + (1− ǫ)
{
v11[e
−rT1 − e−r(T1+∆)] +
[
v11 − α f (1− e
−r∆)− L(1+ e−r∆)
]
e−r(T1+∆)
}
, (22)
for it loses the first-mover advantage at time T1 + ∆ with probability 1− ǫ. The differ-
ence with πs1 is (ignoring the discount factor e
−rT1):
ǫe−r∆
[
α f (1− e−r∆) + L(1+ e−r∆)
]
− (1− e−r∆)(1+ e−r∆)(α f − L). (23)
When ǫ is large enough, this difference is strictly positive, with the precise condition
ǫ >
1− e−r∆
e−r∆
·
(1+ e−r∆)(α f − L)
α f (1− e−r∆) + L(1+ e−r∆)
≡ ǫ∆. (24)
As ∆ → 0, e−r∆ → 1, the threshold value ǫ∆ approaches to zero. When the reaction
lag is small enough, a tiny perturbation suffices to eliminate the war equilibrium.
40The scale economy of litigation may come from the ‘learning effect.’ See Lerner (1995) and papers cited
there. Or, firms may hesitate to enforce their patent rights offensively due to the reputation concern in an
industry with a ‘free atmosphere’ tradition. Semiconductor and software are two examples until the 1990s.
A countersuit entails no such damage.
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C Full Characterization of Investment Outcomes
In this appendix we write down all the possibilities of investment outcomes corre-
sponding to patent profiles, for c ∈ (min{c0, c1},max{c
∗
0 , c
∗
1}]. There are ten scenarios.
Note that when there are multiple investment equilibria for a given patent profile, we
list them all in the same cell. For example, in case 3, at P = (1, 1), both E = (1, 1) and
(0, 0) are possible outcomes.
⋄ Case 1 applies when c1 < c < cˆ < c
∗
1 < c0 < c
∗
0 , or c1 < c < cˆ < c0 < c
∗
1 < c
∗
0 , or
c1 < c < c0 < cˆ < c
∗
1 < c
∗
0 .
⋄ Case 2 applies when c0 = c1 < cˆ < c < c
∗
0 = c
∗
1 , or c0 < c1 < cˆ < c < c
∗
0 < c
∗
1 , or
c1 < cˆ < c0 < c < c
∗
1 < c
∗
0 , or c1 < c0 < cˆ < c < c
∗
1 < c
∗
0 .
⋄ Case 3 applies when c0 = c1 < c < cˆ < c
∗
0 = c
∗
1 , or c0 < c1 < c < c
∗
0 < cˆ < c
∗
1 , or
c0 < c1 < c < cˆ < c
∗
0 < c
∗
1 , or c1 < c0 < c < cˆ < c
∗
1 < c
∗
0 .
⋄ Case 4 applies when c1 < cˆ < c < c
∗
1 < c0 < c
∗
0, or c1 < cˆ < c < c0 < c
∗
1 < c
∗
0.
⋄ Case 5 applies when c1 < cˆ < c
∗
1 < c0 < c < c
∗
0 , or c1 < cˆ < c0 < c
∗
1 < c < c
∗
0 , or
c1 < c0 < cˆ < c
∗
1 < c < c
∗
0 .
⋄ Case 6 applies when c0 < c
∗
0 < c1 < c < cˆ < c
∗
1, or c0 < c1 < c
∗
0 < c < cˆ < c
∗
1.
⋄ In case 7, the unique E = (1, 1) prevails in all P 6= (1, 1); and at P = (1, 1), there are
two equilibria E = (1, 1) and (0, 0). This scenario applies when c0 < c < c
∗
0 < c1 <
cˆ < c∗1 , or c0 < c < c1 < c
∗
0 < cˆ < c
∗
1 , or c0 < c < c1 < cˆ < c
∗
0 < c
∗
1 .
⋄ In case 8, the unique E = (0, 0) prevails in all P 6= (0, 0); and at P = (0, 0), there are
two equilibria E = (0, 0) and (1, 1). This applies when c0 < c
∗
0 < c1 < cˆ < c < c
∗
1 , or
c0 < c1 < c
∗
0 < cˆ < c < c
∗
1 , or c0 < c1 < cˆ < c
∗
0 < c < c
∗
1 .
⋄ In case 9, there are two equilibria E = (0, 0) and (1, 1) for all P. This applies when
c0 < c
∗
0 < c < c1 < cˆ < c
∗
1 .
⋄ In case 10, there are two equilibria E = (1, 0) and (0, 1) for all P. This applies when
p1p1p1
p2p2p2
case 1 case 2 case 3
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
(1, 1)(1, 1)
(1, 1)
(1, 1)
(1, 0)(1, 0)(1, 0)
(0, 1)(0, 1)(0, 1)
(0, 0) (1, 1)/(0, 0)
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p1p1p1
p2p2p2
case 4 case 5 case 6
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
(1, 1)
(1, 0)(1, 0)
(0, 1)(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 1)/(0, 0)
(1, 1)/(0, 0)(1, 0)/(0, 1)
(1, 0)/(0, 1)
c1 < cˆ < c
∗
1 < c < c0 < c
∗
0 .
D Alternative Industrial Structure
In this appendix we consider an alternative market environment. For simplicity, as-
sume: v10 ≥ 2v11 ≥ 2v0 ≥ 0, where v0 = v0e for both e ∈ {0, 1}. By interpreting e as
the entry decision, this assumption is compatible with the single product framework
considered by Bessen (2003), Me´nie`re and Parlane (2004). If, say, only F2 infringes
F1’s patent, it has to exit the market. F1 enjoys the monopoly profit v10, and F2 gets
v0. A second consequence of this modification is that, when firms split the monopoly
profit in case of mutual blocking, then, ignoring the enforcement cost, the outcome of
a litigation war is no more a zero-sum transfer between the two. Higher joint payoff
(v10 + v0) can only be realized through litigation, and this increases the return from
a war. The truce equilibrium exists only when enforcement is sufficiently costly to
offset this gain. To see how other results are affected, suppose the truce equilibrium
exists.
 Small c: When firms always invest, expected payoffs are summarized in Table 4.
The offensive and defensive values of a patent are α(v10 − v11) − L and α(v11 −
v0) + L, respectively. Since v10 − v11 ≥ v11 − v0, we don’t necessarily have strategic
p2
0 1
p1
0 v11 − c αv0 + (1− α)v11 − c− L
1 αv10 + (1− α)v11 − c− L v11 − c
Table 4: Payoff of small c
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complementarity as in Proposition 2. But the comparative statics with respect to L
holds: patents are more likely to be SC for larger L.
 Intermediate c: When firms invest only if protected by patent-holding, payoffs are
summarized in Table 5.
The offensive value (v10 − v11) is strictly higher than the defensive value (v11 −
v0 − c). Patents are SS. Note that this result is consistent with Proposition 3: joint
profit concern determines patents’ strategic property. In a sense, the single product
environment leads to a narrower set of results since it allows only strategic substi-
tutability.
E Asymmetric Information in Interim Licensing
Here we show that our results are qualitatively robust to interim licensing costs in-
troduced in the way of Bebchuk (1984), i.e. settlement bargaining under asymmetric
information. After the investment stage, suppose each patent-holder Fi receives some
private information regarding the power of its patent, αi: e.g., Fi is aware of some
prior arts about the validity of its patent; or after reverse engineering efforts it has a
more precise assessment of the extent to which its patent reads on F2’s investment.
Let αi ∈ {α, α¯}, with α < α¯, i ∈ {1, 2}. Assume i.i.d., the probability of α¯ equals to
ρ ∈ (0, 1), and denote the expected value as αe. Assumption 2 holds for both α and α¯ :
litigation threat is credible for both types, and firms never retreat upon receiving an
infringement notice. When bargaining, we let the uninformed party (the defendant)
makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer.
We look for this case: (i) when only one patent matters, e.g. p1 = e2 = 1 and
p1 · e2 = 0, to save on the settlement payment, F2 screens F1’s type by litigating with
type-α¯. Bargaining fails with probability ρ; and (ii) when P = E = (1, 1), the truce
p2
0 1
p1
0 v11 − c v0
1 v10 − c v11 − c
Table 5: Payoff of Intermediate c
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equilibrium exists, and so no need to engage in interim licensing.
 One effective patent: Consider F1 threats to sue F2, and the latter makes a take-it-
or-leave-it settlement payment s. The type-α1 F1 accepts if the offer is high enough:
s ≥ α1 f − L. There are three cases: (i) if s < α f − L, then no settlement and F2 is
expected to pay αe f + L in litigation; (ii) if s ∈ [α f − L, α¯ f − L), then F2 settles only
with type-α patent-holder. With the lowest necessary offer s = α f − L, F2 is expected
to pay (1− ρ)(α f − L) + ρ(α¯ f + L); and (iii) if s ≥ α¯ f − L, F2 settles with both types
by the minimum licensing payment s = α¯ f − L. F2 screens F1 if and only if:
(1− ρ)(α f − L) + ρ(α¯ f + L) < α¯ f − L ⇒ 2ρL < (1− ρ)(α¯− α) f , (25)
and (1− ρ)(α f − L) + ρ(α¯ f + L) < αe + L ⇒ α f − L < α f + L. (26)
 Truce equilibrium: When P = E = (1, 1), the truce equilibrium exists if the profit
from a litigation war is negative for both types of patent-holders. Depending on one’s
own type, the profits from a war are π(α) = α f − αe f − 2L = −ρ∆α f − 2L < 0 and
π(α¯) = α¯ f − αe f − 2L = (1− ρ)∆α f − 2L.
For our purpose, if inequality (25) holds and π(α¯) < 0, litigation takes place with
a positive probability only when there is one effective patent. The expected gain from
holding a patent is αe f − L for the patent-holder, and the expected loss is ρ(α¯ f +
L) + (1− ρ)(α f − L) for the non-patenting firm. With two relevant patents, the truce
equilibrium guarantees firms a peaceful life. It is straightforward to show that all our
results with ex post licensing go through, with accompanying modifications.
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